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1 Introduction
The Australian ATM market is characterized by two features (Reserve Bank of
Australia, 2000 & 2009; Filipovski and Flood, 2010). First of all, since March
2009, interchange fees and foreign fees have been removed and replaced by a
pricing scheme where ATM owners directly charge a fee to any cardholder who
uses their ATMs.1 Withdrawing money is free when the cardholder uses an
ATM belonging to his or her own bank. For the Reserve Bank of Australia, the
objective of the “direct charging reform” was to encourage ATM deployment,
promote competition for ATM services, and improve price transparency.2 In
the RBA bulletin of June 2010, Reform of the ATM System - One Year On,
Filipovski and Flood (2010) note that the reform contributed to a 6 percent
increase in the number of ATMs between March 2009 and March 2010, but
admit that the price of a typical foreign ATM transaction did not decrease.3
Second of all, as of June 2010, independent ATM deployers (IADs) owned
about half of the approximately 28,800 ATMs, while banks and credit unions
owned the remainder. IADs have also been responsible for half of the deploy-
ment surge since the reform. They only offer ATM services and have been
present in the withdrawal market since 1997. According to the RBA, their
existence has permitted the extension of ATM services to places that might
otherwise not have been covered.
The ATM literature includes several works on the impact of a direct charg-
ing reform. This literature shows that such a reform increases ATM deploy-
ment (Donze and Dubec, 2009) at the cost of higher ATM usage fees (Massoud
and Bernhardt, 2002). The reason is as follows: ATM fees introduce some in-
compatibility between banks’ ATM networks. The first consequence of this
incompatibility is that a bank can expand its deposit market share by rais-
ing its ATM fees, as this increases the cost for customers of banking with a
competitor. Banks take this into account, and choose ATM fees above the
1In the previous system, each foreign withdrawal incurred two fees: an interchange fee
flowing from the issuing bank to the acquirer (the ATM owner) and a foreign fee paid by
the cardholder to his or her own bank.
2Salop (1990) designed the direct charging scheme to eliminate interchange fees and
enhance the self-regulation of the withdrawal market. The collusive role of the interchange
fee is analyzed theoretically by Matutes and Padilla (1994) and Donze and Dubec (2006) &
(2009).
3In the RBA bulletin of March 2011, Flood, Hancock, and Smith (2011) even report a
slight increase of ATM fees between May 2010 and December 2010.
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level they would choose if they considered the withdrawal market separately
from the deposit market. The second consequence is that a customer prefers
to be a cardholder of a bank with many ATMs, in order to limit the number
of foreign withdrawals. Banks are therefore incentivized to deploy ATMs in
order to attract depositors. This effect is strengthened by the high ATM fees
banks earn from foreign withdrawals. Banks suffer from direct charging: their
profits are negatively affected by the deployment race. Consumers benefit from
direct charging when they have a strong preference for large ATM networks.
In this case, they take advantage of the deployment surge even if withdrawals
are more expensive.
The previous papers do not take into account the existence of independent
deployers of ATMs. By competing with banks in deployment and prices, IADs
affect the welfare of both consumers and banks. The objective of this paper is
to study the impact of direct charging when both banks and IADs are present
in the withdrawal market. Do IADs benefit consumers by enlarging the ATM
network or by making foreign withdrawals less expensive? Do they diminish
bank profitability by intensifying the competition for withdrawals?
We show that IAD entry favors ATM deployment. Paradoxically, banks
benefit from IAD entry. The intuition is the following. Under direct charging,
a bank can attract depositors by expanding its ATM network. This effect
is weakened when IADs enter the market: as their ATMs are accessible to
all cardholders at the same price, banks become less differentiated by their
own networks. Consequently, banks deploy fewer machines and their profits
increase. We also show that consumer surplus decreases when the first in-
dependent deployers enter the market: IAD entry makes banks deploy fewer
ATMs, so it becomes increasingly difficult for cardholders to find a free ATM.
As more IADs enter, banks exit the ATM business altogether and consumer
surplus increases with ATM deployment. However, consumer surplus only re-
covers its initial level if consumers value the enlargement of the ATM network
very highly.
Several other papers consider the competition between banks and indepen-
dent deployers on the withdrawal market. In Donze and Dubec (2010), we
study the effects of a cost-based regulation of the interchange fee - an alter-
native reform which is also intended to limit its collusive power - on ATM
deployment. ATM services are then provided by banks and a fixed number of
independent deployers. We consider the pricing scheme used in Great Britain:
banks do not charge for ATM usage but receive an interchange fee on shared
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transactions, while IADs do not receive interchange fees but charge consumers
direct ATM fees. We show that such cost-based regulation causes the inter-
change fee to fall over time. This progressively reduces banks’ incentives to
deploy free ATMs and pushes IADs to deploy pay-to-use machines. Wenzel
(2010) also considers the pricing scheme used in Great Britain and studies the
impact of IAD entry on welfare for different levels of the interchange fee. We
will compare his results with those of the present paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up the model. In
section 3, we consider the case in which there are no IADs. In section 4, we
consider the case with banks and IADs. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
There are two banks denoted by i ∈ {1, 2} located at the two ends of a product
space [0, 1]. A mass one of consumers of banking services are distributed
uniformly along the product space. There are d independent ATM deployers
denoted by k ∈ {1, ..., d}.
Banks and IADS
Bank i provides its cardholders with basic banking services (deposits) and
free access to its ni ATMs in exchange of an account fee pi. The marginal
cost of providing the basic services is normalized to zero. IADs do not have
cardholders and only provide ATM services. The number of ATMs operated by
IAD k is denoted by n̂k. The total number of ATMs is n = n1 +n2 +
∑k=d
k=1 n̂k.
The cost to a bank of deploying and operating an ATM is c.4 We introduce
a cost difference between banks and IADs: the cost to an IAD of deploying
and running an ATM is µc where µ is an exogenous parameter satisfying
0 < µ < 3/4.5 The marginal cost of processing a withdrawal is normalized to
zero.
4This cost includes installation, depreciation, site rental, maintenance, communication
costs, cash replenishment, and the opportunity cost of the cash in the machine.
5Empirical evidence available for the USA and the UK suggests that µ = 0.5 is a rea-
sonable value. In the UK, the typical cost to a bank of operating an on-premise ATM is
£19,000 per year, and £33,000 for an off-premise ATM. The same service costs £9,500 to
an IAD (House of Commons, Treasury Committee. 2005). In the USA, according to the
2006 ATM deployer report (Dove Consulting, 2006), a large bank incurs annual operating
costs of $13,572 for an on-premise ATM and $20,832 for an off-premise ATM. The annual
operating cost is $8,160 per ATM for a large IAD.
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We consider the following pricing scheme (“direct charging”):
• There is no interchange fee.
• Bank i does not charge its own cardholders for ATM usage.
• Bank i’s cardholders pay a fee sj to bank j for each withdrawal made at
an ATM belonging to j.
• IAD k charges all cardholders a fee ŝk per withdrawal made at its ma-
chines.
In other words, each bank discriminates between its own and its competitor’s
cardholders for ATM usage. On the contrary, IADs charge the same fee to
everyone.
Consumers
Consumers’ reservation utility is zero. A customer who becomes a deposi-
tor/cardholder of bank i, located at a distance δi in the product space, antic-
ipates a surplus equal to:
CSi = vb − tδi + vi − pi. (1)
The term vb represents the fixed surplus from consuming basic banking ser-
vices. The term tδi is a differentiation cost in the product space. To guarantee
the existence of a solution, t must be sufficiently large, and we must have
vb ≥ 32t. The term vi corresponds to the variable net surplus from consuming
withdrawals. More precisely,
vi = ui − sjqji −
d∑
k=1
ŝkq̂
k
i , (2)
where ui is the variable gross surplus from consuming withdrawals, q
i
i is the
number of domestic withdrawals made by a cardholder of bank i, qji is the
number of withdrawals made at bank j’s ATMs (with j 6= i), and q̂ki is the
number of withdrawals made at IAD k’s ATMs.
To construct the surpluses ui and vi and the demands for withdrawals,
we follow Donze and Dubec (2006 & 2009) and Chioveanu, Fauli-Oller, San-
don´ıs, and Santamar´ıa (2009). Any cardholder of bank i faces wnγ needs of
withdrawing cash, with 0 ≤ γ < 1. Cardholders are willing to make more
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withdrawals as the network grows because it is easier to find an ATM. We will
see that the higher γ, the more consumers value an enlargement of the total
network. When a cardholder is looking for cash, the probability of finding an
ATM belonging to a particular deployer (bank or IAD) is equal to the ATM
market share of this deployer. Once an ATM has been found, any further
search is infinitely costly. The consumer’s valuation of this withdrawal is r
where r is a random draw following a uniform law over [0, 1]. As a conse-
quence the withdrawal occurs with probability one if the ATM belongs to i. It
is made with probability Pr(sj ≤ r) = 1−sj (respectively Pr(ŝk ≤ r) = 1− ŝk)
if the ATM belongs to bank j (respectively to IAD k). Combining equations,
we obtain the individual demands for withdrawals. A cardholder of bank i
makes qii withdrawals at i’s ATMs, with
qii = w
ni
n
nγ, (3)
qji withdrawals at bank j’s machines, with:
qji = w(1− sj)
nj
n
nγ, (4)
q̂ki withdrawals at IAD k’s machines, with:
q̂ki = w(1− ŝk)
n̂k
n
nγ. (5)
Note that the cardholders of the two banks have the same demand for with-
drawals at k’s ATMs. Hence, we can drop subscript i in q̂ki .
In appendix 1, we determine a variable net surplus vi consistent with the
demands given by equations (3), (4) and (5). We obtain:
vi =
w
2
nγ
(
ni
n
+
nj
n
(1− sj)2 +
k=d∑
k=1
n̂k
n
(1− ŝk)2
)
. (6)
Consumer variable net surplus depends on the ATM market shares of the
different deployers negatively weighted by the ATM fees. For given market
shares, it also depends on the total network size: when banks and IADs in-
crease the size of their respective ATM networks by a factor λ > 1, then vi is
increased by a factor λγ. Hence, a higher γ means that consumers value an
enlargement of the total network more highly; they are less quickly satiated
by extra ATMs.
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Demands and profits
The assumptions on vb and t ensure that the market for deposits is entirely
covered. Let δ denote the distance between bank 1 and the consumer who is
equally well-off when purchasing services from bank 1 or bank 2:
v1 − tδ − p1 = v2 − t(1− δ)− p2. (7)
We thus obtain the size of the deposit market of bank i:
Di =
1
2
+
1
2t
(vi − vj − pi + pj). (8)
IADs do not compete with banks in the market for deposits and provide exactly
the same withdrawal services to all cardholders: their existence does not affect
consumers’ decision about where to bank. The profit of bank i can be written
as
pii = piDi + siq
i
j(1−Di)− cni. (9)
The first part of the profit corresponds to the revenue from selling basic bank-
ing services. The second part corresponds to the revenue from the withdrawals
that bank j’s cardholders make at bank i’s machines. The third part is the
cost of deploying and operating the ATMs. The profit of IAD k is
pik = ŝkq̂
k − µcn̂k. (10)
In this expression, revenue comes from a mass one of cardholders, each making
q̂k withdrawals at k’s ATMs.
Timing of the game
First, banks and IADs choose the number of ATMs they deploy and choose
their prices non-cooperatively and simultaneously. Second, consumers choose
their banks and withdraw cash.
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3 The case without independent ATM deploy-
ers
Without IADs, we have d = 0. To characterize the Nash equilibrium of
the model, it is convenient to start by determining the account fee. Setting
∂pii/∂pi = 0, and by symmetry with bank j, we obtain
p∗i = t+ s
∗
i q
i∗
j . (11)
The account fee is the sum of the differentiation parameter and the cost for
bank i of accepting an extra depositor. The latter is actually an opportunity
cost corresponding to the revenues that bank i would obtain if the consumer
chose to become a cardholder of bank j and made qij withdrawals at i’s ATMs.
Let us now determine ATM fees. The first order condition is ∂pii/∂si = 0, or:
(pi − siqij)
∂Di
∂si
+
(
si
∂qij
∂si
+ qij
)
(1−Di) = 0. (12)
By increasing si, bank i makes it less interesting for consumers to join bank j,
and so bank i’s deposit market share increases: the first term of (12) measures
how i’s revenue is affected by the new depositors. The second term represents
the effect of modifying si on the revenue coming from foreign withdrawals. In
appendix 2, we solve equation (12) and obtain s∗i = 2/3. To attract depositors,
bank i chooses an ATM fee above the level it would choose if it considered
ATMs as a stand-alone business: s∗i = 2/3 > 1/2 = arg maxsi siq
i
j.
Finally, let us determine equilibrium deployment. We have ∂pii/∂ni = 0, or:
(pi − siqij)
∂Di
∂ni
+ si
∂qij
∂ni
(1−Di) = c. (13)
By installing a supplementary ATM, bank i attracts extra depositors: the first
term of (13) shows how its revenue is affected by these newcomers. Because of
the supplementary ATM, bank j’s cardholders also make more foreign with-
drawals: the second term of (13) measures the corresponding extra revenues
for bank i. In appendix 2, we show that, at equilibrium,
∂Di
∂ni
=
2
9t
w
n1−γ
. (14)
Expression (14) is decreasing in n which means that it becomes increasingly
difficult for banks to attract cardholders by deploying ATMs as the total net-
work becomes larger. This stems from the fact that the value to consumers
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of an extra ATM decreases with the network size. This effect will play an
important role in the next section. In appendix 2, we solve expression (13)
and obtain
n∗ =
(
5 + γ
18
w
c
) 1
1−γ
. (15)
The surplus of the indifferent consumer (net of vb− 3t2 ) is CS = wnγ/6. Banks’
total profits (net of t) are BS = −(1 + γ)wnγ/18 < 0. The total surplus is
TS = CS+BS = (2−γ)wnγ/18. The results are summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 Under direct charging, bank decisions on the withdrawal mar-
ket affect the deposit market. Banks overinvest in ATMs to attract depositors:
their profits are smaller than they would be if banks did not provide ATM ser-
vices at all (that is 0, net of t). Banks also set ATM usage fees above the level
they would choose if they considered the withdrawal market as a stand-alone
business.
The regulator is likely to underestimate the spillover effects between markets
when evaluating the relevance of the ATM direct charging scheme. For ex-
ample, on average, banks lose money on their ATM operations in the USA.6
According to Dove Consulting (2006), the average monthly revenue per on-
premise ATM was $1,104 while expenses were $1,444. Furthermore, according
to estimates made by Knittel and Stango (2011), large banks’ surcharges are
71% higher than they would be if the withdrawal market was considered as a
stand-alone business. In the next section, we study how IAD entry alters the
previous findings.
4 Effects of IAD entry on bank profitability
and consumer surplus
We now assume that IADs are present in the withdrawal market: d > 0. We
first determine the equilibrium for a given number of independent deployers,
and then study how welfare is affected as more IADs enter the market.
6Although the American ATM pricing scheme (interchange fee, foreign fees and sur-
charges) and the new Australian pricing scheme are not the same, they are formally equiv-
alent according to the so-called neutrality result (Salop (1990), Croft and Spencer (2004),
Donze and Dubec (2009), Chioveanu, Fauli-Oller, Sandonis and Santamaria (2009)).
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4.1 Taxonomy of equilibria for a given number of IADs
We solve for the Nash equilibrium. Details of the derivations are relegated
to appendix 3. Bank i’s maximization problem gives the same expressions as
before: equations (12) and (13).7 It follows that at equilibrium, the account
fee and the ATM fee remain p∗i = t + s
∗
i q
i∗
j and s
∗
i = 2/3. The ATM fee is
not affected by IAD entry because according to our framework, the willingness
to pay for a withdrawal is independent from deployment. We next solve the
maximization problem of IAD k. We start by determining the ATM fees.
The first order condition, ∂pik/∂ŝk = 0, gives ŝ
∗
k = 1/2. Note that s
∗
i > ŝ
∗
k:
IADs choose lower ATM fees than banks because they are not active in the
deposit market and therefore do not use ATM pricing strategically to attract
depositors. Let us finally consider the deployment problem. The first order
condition for an interior solution, ∂pik/∂n̂k = 0, can be written as:
ŝk
∂q̂k
∂n̂k
= µc. (16)
Comparing expression (16) with expression (13) indicates that IAD k does
not face the same incentives to deploy as bank i. There is one factor pushing
IAD k to deploy fewer ATMs than a bank: IAD k does not deploy ATMs
to influence the deposit market. There are two factors pushing IAD k to
deploy more ATMs than a bank. First, IAD k charges all cardholders for
their withdrawals, while bank i only charges non-customers. Second, k has a
cost advantage over banks because µ < 3/4. In appendix 3, we verify that
there are two types of equilibria according to the value of µ. They are detailed
in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Consider a given d ≥ 1. There are two types of equilibria,
depending on the value of µ:
• If 3
4
d−1+γ
d
< µ < 3
4
, both banks and IADs deploy ATMs:
n∗ = ( 5+d+γ
18+4µd
w
c
)
1
1−γ ,
n∗i
n∗ =
9(1−γ)+(12µ−9)d
(1−γ)(18+4µd) ,
n̂∗k
n∗ =
9−10µ−2γµ
(1−γ)(9+2µd) .
• If µ ≤ 3
4
d−1+γ
d
, only IADs deploy ATMs: n∗ =
(
1
4
d−1+γ
d
w
µc
) 1
1−γ
,
n̂∗k
n∗ =
1
d
.
7Assuming an interior solution; otherwise, condition (13) should be written with a sign
≤. See appendix 3 for details.
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When µ is high, both banks and IADs deploy ATMs. In this case the total
network size and the ATM market share of IADs increase as their cost ad-
vantage over banks becomes higher (i.e. when µ decreases). When µ is low,
banks do not deploy ATMs and they only produce basic banking services.
4.2 Effects of IAD entry on profits and consumer sur-
plus
We now study how consumer surplus, banks’ and IADs’ profits and total sur-
plus are modified as the number of IADs increases, starting from d = 0.8 Let
us define d˜ by
d˜ =
3(1− γ)
3− 4µ . (17)
When d is equal to zero, only banks deploy ATMs. When d is between 1 and
d˜, banks and IADs deploy ATMs. When d is larger than d˜, only IADs deploy
ATMs. In what follows, the surplus of the indifferent consumer is written
net of vb − 3t2 . Banks’ total profits are also written net of t. The results are
established in appendix 4.
Deployment. As independent deployers enter the market, the total number
of ATMs rises. Banks’ ATM market share decreases and becomes nil as soon
as d reaches d˜. Banks deploy fewer and fewer ATMs for two reasons. First,
IADs compete with them for foreign withdrawals, diminishing their incentives
to deploy ATMs (in the second term of expression (13), ∂qij/∂ni is decreasing
in n). Second IAD entry makes ATMs a less important differentiator for banks:
at equilibrium,
∂Di
∂ni
=
2
9t
w
n1−γ
(18)
is decreasing in n and banks are less willing to deploy ATMs to attract depos-
itors.9
Prices. The account fee decreases with IAD entry from d = 0 to d = d˜ and
remains constant thereafter. Indeed, p∗i is the sum of the differentiation pa-
rameter t and the opportunity cost of accepting a new cardholder (the foregone
8We treat d as if it was a continuous variable. Results on surplus variations may be
locally different from those obtained with a discrete number of IADs.
9In the model, we ignore one further reason for which banks deploy ATMs: as a substitute
for more costly human tellers. If this was included in the model, banks would probably keep
their on-premise ATMs despite IAD entry, but would abandon their off-premise ATMs.
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ATM fees this cardholder would have paid to bank i if he had chosen to bank
with j). This opportunity cost decreases as IADs enter the market and deploy
ATMs. It becomes nil when banks exit the withdrawal market, that is, when
d is larger than d˜.
Consumer surplus. When d is below d˜, consumer surplus is equal to
CS(d) =
1
8
w
24− 6d+ 12µd− 4γ(6 + µd)
(1− γ)(18 + 4µd)
(
5 + d+ γ
18 + 4µd
w
c
) γ
1−γ
, (19)
which is decreasing in d. IAD entry affects consumer surplus in several ways.
There is one negative effect: it is more difficult for bank i’s cardholders to
find a free ATM, because bank i’s ATM market share diminishes. There are
three positive effects. First, there are more ATMs available from which to
withdraw money. Second, on average, foreign withdrawals become cheaper
since they are increasingly made at IAD ATMs and less frequently at bank
j’s ATMs. Third, account fees also decrease, as explained above. Overall, the
negative effect outweighs the positive effects and consumer surplus decreases
when the first IADs enter the market. When d is larger than d˜, banks exit the
withdrawal market. Consumer surplus becomes
CS(d) =
1
8
w
(
1
4
d− 1 + γ
d
w
µc
) γ
1−γ
, (20)
which increases with IAD entry if consumers value the enlargement of the ATM
network (that is, if γ > 0). As banks are no longer active in the withdrawal
market, IAD entry has only a positive effect on consumer surplus through the
enlargement of the ATM network.
In addition to the previous incremental analysis, it is interesting to compare
consumer surplus under entry to the case without IADs. When γ is large
enough, there is a level of entry, d(γ, µ) ≥ d˜, such that for any d ≥ d(γ, µ),
consumer surplus, CS(d) defined in equation (20), is higher than its initial
level, CS(0).10 In other words, when consumers have strong preferences for
large ATM networks, an entry of a large number of IADs benefits consumers.
Note that in this case, banks are not active in the ATM business. For example,
γ must be higher than 0.357 when µ = 0.5.
10One can easily verify that limd→∞ CS(d) > CS(0) when γ is close to 1. This guarantees
the existence of the threshold, d(γ, µ).
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Banks’ profits. When d is below d˜, banks’ profits are equal to
BS(d) = −2w
3
[3 (1− γ) + (4µ− 3) d] [9 + 9γ + (9− 8µ) d]
(1− γ)(18 + 4µd)2
(
5 + d+ γ
18 + 4µd
w
c
) γ
1−γ
(21)
and are increasing in d. IAD entry causes banks to deploy fewer and fewer
ATMs, but also reduces account and ATM fee revenues. The positive effect due
to deployment cost savings is stronger than the negative effects on revenues
and banks’ profits actually increase with IAD entry. When d is above d˜, banks’
profits (net of t) are constant and equal to 0.
IADs’ profits. When d is below d˜, IADs’ profits are equal to
IADS(d) = w
(9− 10µ− 2γµ)2d
(1− γ)(18 + 4µd)2
(
5 + d+ γ
18 + 4µd
w
c
) γ
1−γ
. (22)
When µ ≤ 9/14 + 3γ/28, expression (22) is increasing in d: the first inde-
pendent deployers that enter the market replace banks in the ATM business
and make increasing profits. When µ > 9/14 + 3γ/28, expression (22) is first
increasing and then decreasing with entry. In this case, the cost advantage of
IADs over banks is weaker, and IADs’ profits start to decrease before banks
exit the withdrawal market. When d is above d˜, IADs’ profits are equal to
IADS(d) = w
1− γ
4d
(
1
4
d− 1 + γ
d
w
µc
) γ
1−γ
, (23)
and are decreasing with entry: more and more independent deployers chase
a number of potential withdrawals, wnγ, with an ever-increasing number of
ATMs, n.
Total surplus. Total surplus is given by TS = CS + BS + IADS. It is
increasing with entry when d is below d˜. Initially, total surplus follows the rise
in banks’ and IADs’ profits. Furthermore, banks’ ATMs are replaced by IADs’
less costly machines. When d is above d˜, three cases are possible. If γ ≤ 8µ/9,
total surplus decreases with entry. In this case, the rise in consumer surplus
does not compensate for the fall in IADs’ profits. If 8µ/9 < γ < 2/3, total
surplus first increases and then decreases with entry. At first, total surplus
follows the increase in consumer surplus, but this is later outweighed by the
fall in IADs’ profits. If γ ≥ 2/3, total surplus is monotonically increasing with
entry.
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It is interesting to compare total surplus under entry to the case without
IADs. One can verify that for any γ and any entry level, total surplus is
higher in the presence of IADs than under the no-entry case. Hence, if we take
the unweighted sum of surpluses as a measure of social welfare, IAD entry is
socially good. The main reason for this result is that IAD entry benefits banks
by limiting the deployment race. For high values of γ, the positive impact of
entry on consumer surplus reinforces the previous effect. The main results are
summarized in proposition 3.
Proposition 3 IAD entry makes it less interesting for each bank to use ATMs
as a way to differentiate from its competitor and attract depositors. As a con-
sequence, the two banks deploy fewer ATMs and their profits increase. Con-
sumer surplus initially decreases with IAD entry, as it becomes more difficult
to make a free withdrawal. Subsequently, consumer surplus increases as more
ATMs are deployed, but only retrieves its initial level if consumers place a high
value on large ATM networks.
Figure 1: Changes in surpluses with IAD entry
To illustrate the changes in surplus resulting from IAD entry, we have drawn
CS, BS, IADS and TS in figure 1 for c = 15000 and different values of
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µ, γ and w.11 Figures 1(a), (b) and (c) are drawn for µ = 0.5 and show
how increasing γ affects the change in consumer surplus. Consumer surplus
decreases with entry as long as banks are active in the withdrawal market but
thereafter increases if consumers value the enlargement of the network. The
increase is more pronounced when γ is high. Consider, for example, figure 1(c)
where γ = 0.6. In this case, for a sufficient level of entry, consumers are better
off compared to the situation where ATM services are provided exclusively
by banks. Figure 1(c) also verifies 8µ/9 < γ < 2/3: total surplus reaches its
maximum for a number of IADs higher than d˜. In this case, the change in total
surplus follows the change in consumer surplus up to some level of entry at
which banks have already left the withdrawal market. Figure 1(d) illustrates
the case where µ > 9/14 + 3γ/28. In this case, IADs’ profits decrease whereas
banks are still active in the withdrawal market.
It is interesting to compare the effects of IAD entry under the direct charg-
ing scheme and an interchange-based scheme. Wenzel (2010) considers a case
where (i) banks do not charge consumers for ATM usage but receive an inter-
change fee on shared transactions (ii) IADs do not receive interchange fees but
charge consumers direct ATM fees. He obtains similar results to ours regard-
ing the effect of IAD entry on deployment, account fees and consumer surplus:
entry favors ATM deployment and lowers account fees. Furthermore, the range
of interchange fees for which consumers benefit from IAD entry becomes larger
as consumer preferences for large ATM networks grow. Nevertheless, the ef-
fect of entry on banks’ profits is very different in the framework considered
by Wenzel. As banks do not charge for ATM usage, their ATM networks are
perfectly equivalent for cardholders, no matter their affiliation. As a result,
there is no deployment race to attract depositors and IAD entry induces lower
deployment cost savings for banks than under direct charging. In this case,
entry reduces bank profits by diminishing account fees and strengthening the
competition for withdrawals.
11We calibrate the model for different values of µ and γ by choosing w so that, at equi-
librium, total ATM deployment remains close to 1/1000. The calibration permits to obtain
similar scales when we represent the surpluses in the different cases.
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5 Concluding remarks
On the 3rd of March 2009, the Reserve Bank of Australia suppressed inter-
change fees on shared ATM transactions and replaced them by direct fees
charged by ATM owners. The objective was to design a competitive with-
drawal market. The Australian reform could be imitated in other countries
and it is therefore important to assess its implications, both theoretically and
empirically. In Donze and Dubec (2009), we showed that ATM direct charging
boosts deployment and makes consumers better off than they would be under
a regime with interchange and foreign fees, as long as consumers have a strong
preference for large networks (which seems reasonable when travel costs are
high). However, direct charging negatively affects bank profitability. In the
present article we have shown that the entry of independent deployers limits
banks’ incentives to use ATM deployment strategically to expand their deposit
market shares. This mitigates the deployment race between banks, and their
profits increase. The effect of IAD entry on consumer surplus is ambiguous.
As long as banks are active in the withdrawal market, consumer surplus de-
creases with IAD entry. Once banks abandon the ATM business, consumer
surplus increases with entry. However, consumer surplus can only recover its
no-entry level if consumers have a strong preference for large ATM networks.
6 Appendices
Appendix 1. Expression of ui and vi.
Let us consider vi = ui − sjqji −
∑d
k=1 ŝkq̂
k
i with
ui = (q
i
i −
n1−γ
2wni
(qii)
2) + (qji −
n1−γ
2wnj
(qji )
2) +
d∑
k=1
(q̂ki −
n1−γ
2wn̂k
(q̂ki )
2). (24)
Differentiating vi with respect to q
i
i, q
j
i and q̂
k
i we obtain the demand functions
(3), (4) and (5). Plugging these three expressions in vi, we obtain expression
(6), the optimized variable net surplus from withdrawing.
Appendix 2. Proof of proposition 1
Using expressions (2) and (8) one can write
∂Di
∂si
= − 1
2t
∂vj
∂si
= − 1
2t
(
∂uj
∂qij
∂qij
∂si
− qij − si
∂qij
∂si
). (25)
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However at consumer’s optimum, ∂uj/∂q
i
j = si, so that
∂Di
∂si
=
1
2t
qij. (26)
Using expressions (11) and (26), one can rewrite equation (12) as
1
2
qij + (−wsi
ni
n
nγ + qij)(1−Di) = 0. (27)
At equilibrium, Di = 1/2 and we obtain s
∗
i = 2/3. Let us now determine the
equilibrium deployment, we have
∂Di
∂ni
=
1
2t
∂(vi − vj)
∂ni
=
(equilibrium)
2
9t
wn
γ−1
. (28)
Expression (11) and (13) gives
2
9
wn
γ−1
+ wsi(1− si)(1−Di)
(
nγ−1 + ni(γ − 1)nγ−2
)
= c. (29)
At equilibrium we have Di = 1/2, ni = n/2, si = 2/3, and we obtain
n∗ =
(
5 + γ
18
w
c
) 1
1−γ
. (30)
Appendix 3. Proof of proposition 2
The problem of maximization has two types of solutions: interior or corner.
We have ∂pii/∂ni ≤ 0 and ∂pik/∂n̂k ≤ 0 for any i and k:
w
9
(
3− (1− γ)ni
n
)
nγ−1 − c ≤ 0 (31)
and
w
4
(
1− (1− γ) n̂k
n
)
nγ−1 − µc ≤ 0. (32)
We first look for (interior) solutions where the two first-order conditions are
satisfied with equalities. We have
µ
w
9
(
3− (1− γ)ni
n
)
=
w
4
(
1− (1− γ) n̂k
n
)
. (33)
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However n = 2ni + dn̂k or 2
ni
n
+ d n̂k
n
= 1. Plugging this last equality in (33),
we obtain
n∗i
n∗
=
9(1− γ) + (12µ− 9)d
(1− γ)(18 + 4µd) (34)
and
n̂∗k
n∗
=
9− 10µ− 2γµ
(1− γ)(9 + 2µd) . (35)
Plugging expression (34) in expression (31) we obtain
n∗ = (
5 + d+ γ
18 + 4µd
w
c
)
1
1−γ . (36)
For the solution to exist, one must have
n∗i
n∗ ≥ 0 and
n̂∗k
n̂∗ ≥ 0 or equivalently
3
4
(d−1+γ
d
) ≤ µ ≤ 9
10+2γ
. Note this last inequality is verified because 9
10+2γ
≥ 3
4
.
Suppose µ ≤ 3
4
(d−1+γ
d
), we obtain the corner solution
n̂∗k
n̂∗ =
1
d
and
n∗i
n∗ = 0.
Condition (31) is satisfied with inequality while condition (32) is satisfied with
equality, we obtain
n∗ =
(
1
4
d− 1 + γ
d
w
µc
) 1
1−γ
. (37)
Appendix 4. Consumer surplus, banks’ surplus, IADs’ surplus and total
surplus
In what follows, the surplus of the indifferent consumer is written net of vb− 3t2 .
Similarly banks’ total profits are written net of t. Let us define d˜, the number
of IADs above which banks do not deploy any ATMs:
d˜ =
3(1− γ)
3− 4µ . (38)
(i) Variation of CS.
For d ≤ d˜, the surplus of the indifferent consumer is
CS(d) =
1
8
w
24− 6d+ 12µd− 4γ(6 + µd)
(1− γ)(18 + 4µd)
(
5 + d+ γ
18 + 4µd
w
c
) γ
1−γ
. (39)
Differentiating with respect to d, we obtain
∂CS
∂d
= −w
2
(9−10µ−2µγ)[15−24γ+9γ2+d(3−6γµ+2γ2µ)]
(1−γ)2(5+d+γ)(18+4µd)2
(
5+d+γ
18+4µd
w
c
) γ
1−γ
. (40)
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This expression is negative. Indeed µ < 3/4 implies 9−10µ−2µγ > 0. We have
also 15−24γ+9γ2 = (1−γ)(15−9γ) > 0. Furthermore, as maxγ∈[0,1] γ(3−γ) =
2 and µ ≤ 3/4, we have 2µγ(3 − γ) ≤ 3 so that 3 − 2µγ(3 − γ) ≥ 0. Hence
15− 24γ + 9γ2 + d(3− 6γµ+ 2γ2µ) > 0 for any d.
For d ≥ d˜, consumer surplus is
CS =
1
8
w
(
1
4
d− 1 + γ
d
w
µc
) γ
1−γ
. (41)
It is increasing in d when γ > 0.
(ii) Variation of BS. For d ≤ d˜, banks’ surplus is given by
BS = −2
3
w
[3 (1− γ) + (4µ− 3) d] [9 + 9γ + (9− 8µ) d]
(1− γ)(18 + 4µd)2
(
5 + d+ γ
18 + 4µd
w
c
) γ
1−γ
.
(42)
The derivative with respect to d is
∂BS
∂d
= 4w
3
[(54−60µ−27γ+32µ2γ)d2+(270−300µ−162γ+228µγ−54γ2)d−27γ3−216γ2+243γ]
(1−γ)2(5+d+γ)(18+4µd)3
× (9− 10µ− 2µγ)×
(
5+d+γ
18+4µd
w
c
) γ
1−γ
. (43)
This expression is positive which means that BS is increasing in d. To prove
positivity, note first that µ < 3/4 implies 9 − 10µ − 2µγ > 0. Second 54 −
60µ − 27γ + 32µ2γ is decreasing in µ on [0, 3/4] and equal to 9(1 − γ) > 0
when µ = 3/4. Third 270− 300µ− 162γ + 228µγ − 54γ2 is also decreasing in
µ and equal to 45 + 9γ− 54γ2 = 9 (6γ + 5) (1− γ) > 0 when µ = 3/4. Finally
−27γ3 − 216γ2 + 243γ = 27γ (γ + 9) (1− γ) > 0.
For d ≥ d˜, banks’ surplus (net of t) becomes constant and equal to 0.
(iii) Variation of IADS. For d ≤ d˜, IAD surplus is given by
IADS = w
(9− 10µ− 2γµ)2d
(1− γ)(18 + 4µd)2
(
5 + d+ γ
18 + 4µd
w
c
) γ
1−γ
. (44)
Differentiating with respect to d we obtain
∂IADS
∂d
= w
(9−10µ−2γµ)2[90−72γ−18γ2+d(18−20µ−4µγ)−4µd2(1−γ)]
(1−γ)2(5+d+γ)(18+4µd)3
(
5+d+γ
18+4µd
w
c
) γ
1−γ
.
(45)
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The derivative (45) has the sign of 90 − 72γ − 18γ2 + d(18 − 20µ − 4µγ) −
4µd2(1− γ). This expression is positive for d = 0. The solution of 90− 72γ −
18γ2+d(18−20µ−4µγ)−4µd2(1−γ) = 0 is equal to d˜ when µ = 9/14+3γ/28.
When µ ≤ 9/14 + 3γ/28, expression (45) is positive between d = 0 and d = d˜.
When µ > 9/14 + 3γ/28, expression (45) is first positive and then negative
between d = 0 and d = d˜
For d ≥ d˜, IAD surplus is equal to
IADS = w
1− γ
4d
(
1
4
d− 1 + γ
d
w
µc
) γ
1−γ
, (46)
and is decreasing with d.
(iv) Variation of TS. Total surplus is TS = CS +BS + IADS.
For d ≤ d˜, the derivative of TS is
∂TS
∂d
= w
[ (
432− 732µ− 72µ2γ2 + 240µ2 + 136µ2γ + 216µγ − 216γ) d2
+6
(
495− 790µ− 8µ2γ2 + 80µ2γ − 216γ + 200µ2 − 72γ2 + 334µγ − 36µγ2) d
+4050− 5400µ+ 3240µγ − 648γ − 3186γ2−216γ3+1944µγ2+216γ3µ
]
× (9− 10µ− 2γµ)
(1− γ)2(5 + d+ γ)(18 + 4µd)3
(
5 + d+ γ
18 + 4µd
w
c
) γ
1−γ
. (47)
This expression is positive so that TS is increasing in d over the specified set.
To show positivity, note first that 432 − 732µ − 72µ2γ2 + 240µ2 + 136µ2γ +
216µγ− 216γ is decreasing in µ on [0, 3/4] and equal to 9
2
(9γ + 4) (1− γ) > 0
when µ = 3/4. Second, 2970− 4740µ+ 48µ2γ2 + 480µ2γ − 1296γ + 1200µ2 −
432γ2+2004µγ−216µγ2 is decreasing in µ on [0, 3/4] and equal to 9 (63γ + 10)×
(1− γ) > 0 when µ = 3/4. Third, 4050− 5400µ+ 3240µγ − 648γ − 3186γ2 −
216γ3+1944µγ2+216γ3µ is decreasing in µ on [0, 3/4] and equal to 54γ (1− γ)×
(γ + 33) ≥ 0 when µ = 3/4.
For d ≥ d˜, total surplus becomes
TS =
w
8
d+ 2(1− γ)
d
(
1
4
d− 1 + γ
d
w
µc
) γ
1−γ
.
The derivative with respect to d is
∂TS
∂d
=
w
8
(3γ − 2)d+ 2− 2γ
d2(d− 1 + γ)
(
1
4
d− 1 + γ
d
w
µc
) γ
1−γ
. (48)
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When 2/3 ≤ γ < 1 then ∂TS/∂d is positive so that TS is increasing in d.
Consider γ < 2/3. Let d̂ denote the number of IADs that makes expression
(48) equal to zero. We have
d̂ =
2− 2γ
2− 3γ . (49)
If d̂ > d˜ (or equivalently 8µ/9 < γ < 2/3), then total surplus is increasing up
to d̂ and decreasing thereafter. If d̂ ≤ d˜ (or equivalently γ ≤ 8µ/9), then total
surplus is decreasing when d is above d˜.
7 Bibliography
Chioveanu, I., Fauli-Oller, R., Sandon´ıs, J., and Santamar´ıa J., 2009. ATM
Surcharges: Effects on Deployment and Welfare. Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics 57 (3) p 613-635.
Croft, E., Spencer, B., 2004. Fees and Surcharging in ATM Networks: the
Role of Nonbanks and Depositor Base. Working Paper.
Donze, J., Dubec, I., 2006. The role of Interchange Fees in ATM Networks.
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24 (1), p 29-43.
Donze, J., Dubec, I., 2009. Paying for ATM usage: Good for Consumers, Bad
for Banks? Journal of Industrial Economics 57 (3), p 583-612.
Donze, J., Dubec, I., 2010. The Effects of Regulating Interchange Fees at Cost
on the ATM Market. Economics Letters. 107 (2), p 187-189.
Dove Consulting, 2006. 2006 ATM Deployer Study.
Filipovski, B., Flood, D., 2010. Reform of the ATM System - One Year On.
RBA Bulletin. June Quarter.
Flood, D., Hancock, J. and Smith K., 2011. The ATM Reforms - New Evidence
from Survey and Market Data. RBA Bulletin. March Quarter.
Knittel, C., Stango, V., 2011. Strategic Incompatibility in ATM Markets.
Forthcoming in Journal of Banking and Finance.
Massoud, N., Bernhardt, D., 2002. Rip-off ATM surcharges. Rand Journal of
Economics 33, p 96-115.
21
Matutes, C., Padilla. A. J., 1994. Shared ATM Networks and Banking Com-
petition. European Economic Review, 38: p 1113-38.
McAndrews, J. 2003., Automated Teller Machine Network Pricing, a Review
of the Literature. The Review of Network Economics, 2 (2), p 146-158.
Reserve Bank of Australia & the Australian Competition and Consumer Com-
mission. 2000. Debit and Credit Card Schemes in Australia: A Study of
Interchange Fees and Access Competition.
Reserve Bank of Australia. 2009. Payments System Board Annual Report.
Salop, S., 1990. Deregulating Self-Regulated Shared ATM Networks. Eco-
nomics of Innovation and New Technology, 1 p 85-96.
Wenzel, T., 2010. Independent Service Operators in ATM Markets. Working
Paper.
22
